















































How does  fiscal decentralisation affect  the development of a health  system? Evidence  from 
health  care  decentralisation  in  Europe  can  offer  some  insights  to  the  question  above.    This 
paper addresses the effects of health care decentralisation in Europe, and reviews some of the 
key  questions  on  the  design  of  a  health  system.  We  argue  that  contrary  to  old  mobility 
argument,  the  effects  of  health  care  decentralisation  result  from  tighter  political  agency, 
which  generally  stands  as  an  alternative  to  health  care  privatisation.  However,  whether 
efficiency improves after a process of decentralisation depends heavily on the incentives fiscal 
design  exerts  on  cost  –containment,  inter‑jurisdictional  competition,  policy  innovation  and 
diffusion. Experiences of health care decentralisation highlight important concerns associated 
















































Health  care  systems  generally  refer  to  packages  of  essential  services, 
delivered  either  by  the  state  or  the  market.  In  Europe,  health  insurance 
schemes  are  financed  by  general  taxes  or  hypothecated  social  insurance 
contributions,  and  private  insurance  plays  either  a  complementary  or 
supplementary  role.    Such  public  insurance  schemes  have  developed  for 
reasons related to both efficiency and equity, including: a) to take advantage 
of  pooling  and  single  payer  welfare  gains;  b)  to  allow  coverage  for 
unexpected  risks,  and  especially  c)  to  reduce  problems  of  information 
asymmetry, which make  ‘accountable governance’ a  challenging endeavour. 







health  care,  (followed  by  social  care  and  education),  is  the  most  common 
responsibility  that  has  been  decentralised  to  subnational  governments,. 
Hence,  it  seems  reasonable  that  fiscal  federalism  scholars  choose  to  employ 










(i) direct  improvements  of  static  (allocative)  and  dynamic  (innovation)  
“efficiency” effects of the health system and  
(ii) expanding  participation  though  the  existence  of  different  political 
cycles and the emergence of additional sources of political competition, which 




Both  effects  are  possible  because  75%  of  total  health  care  expenditures  are 
publicly  financed  (OECD,  2009).  Health  system  decentralisation  thus 
encompasses moulding health systems to allocate health care responsibilities 
in  such  a  way  that  health  policies  meet  the  demands  of  the  regionally 
heterogeneous median voter. This is made possible because of thecompetitive 
nature  of  intergovernmental  decisions,  as  explained  below.The  classical 
decentralisation theorem (Oates, 1972) based on the preference–policy match1, 
is  rooted  in  an  implicit  assumption of welfare  improving mobility  (Tiebout, 
1956).  However,  this  assumption  might  not  hold  in  a  relatively  immobile 
European  population  and  hence,  mobility  cannot  be  the  maindriving 
mechanism.  Instead,  the  most  powerful  and  crucial  incentives  lie  in  the 




Furthermore,  unlike  other  areas  of  public  sector  responsibility,  health  care 
outcomes are subject  to more  information asymmetries  from an  individual’s 
standpoint.  Health  care  services,  unlike  educational  services,  are 
intermediated  by  agents  (e.g.,  doctors),  and  therefore  objective  quality 
dimensions of health services are  filtered by such agents. Additionally, such 
agents might have interests besides that of patient wellbeing. This implies that 
patients  only  judge  health  systems  performance  according  to  observable 
criteria,  including the  length of waiting  lists and waiting  times, bureaucracy 
and more other process related outcomes that may not necessarily be related 
to  the adequacy of  treatment or other dimensions of quality of care. Finally, 
another  important  feature  of  health  care  as  services  is  that  although  health 
care  is  regarded  as  a  “merit  good”,  it  can  also  be  provided  by  the market. 
Hence,  if  the  state  fails  to  satisfy  the  heterogeneous  demands  of  all  social 
groups,  a market  for private health  insurance, outpatient  and  inpatient  care 
can develop.   
The  special  nature  of  health  care  and  information  asymmetries  make  it  a 
distinct  area  of  policy  responsibility.    As  part  of  this,specific  constitutional 
and fiscal design becomes crucial.   For example, for fiscal decentralisation to 
have a full  impact,  fiscal responsibilities  in the form of taxes, and to a  lesser 




in  one  region  will  have  spillover  effects  to  other  regions.  Therefore,  the 
decentralising  the  regulation of  such conditions are unlikely  to  result  in    an 
improvement on overall welfare. For  instance, Baicker et al  (2010) document 





innovation.  Finally,  health  packages  are  one  of  the  most  costly  welfare 
services governments provide, so it seems reasonable to expect that devolving 
health  care  responsibilities  under  stringent  budget  constraints  is  likely  to 
improve government efficiency. 
This  paper  aims  to  review  the  contending  issues  that  arise  from  the 
decentralisation  of  health  system  responsibilities  to  subcentral  governments 
from a fiscal federalism standpoint. We  examine how a more balanced spread 
of  both  political  and  financial  authority  to  different  levels  of  government 
(thus  reshaping  the vertical  structure of  the health  system) affects processes 
and health care outcomes.   We argue that unlike the old mobility argument, 
health  care  decentralisation  is  likely  to  influence  tighter  political  agency  on 
the performance and dynamics of the health system.  To do so, we rely mainly 
upon  the  theory  of  fiscal  federalism  and  recent  developments  in  political 
economy  to explore  the economic effects of devolution. Unlike  the previous 
literature on welfare  state  federalism we  incorporate  the  influence of policy 
innovation and different forms of  inter‑jurisdictional competition in exerting 
an influence on the development of regional inequalities.  
The  next  section  focuses  on  the  reasons  for  fiscal  decentralisation  in  health 
care.  Section 3 will discuss the different sources of vertical imbalances in the 
allocation of political and fiscal responsibilities, whilst section 4 will provide a 









Decentralisation,  as  defined  here,  proxies  for  autonomy  of  subcentral 
governments (Oates, 1985), or the strength of subnational power in the form 
of employment control as well as devolved regulatory and  taxation powers.  
More  recently,  economists  have  begun  to  see  decentralisation  as  a  way  of 
tightening  the  political  agency  between  constituents  and  incumbents  to 
enhance the mechanisms of the so‑called ‘political agency’ (Besley, 2006).  It is 
different  from  formal  (or  legal)  federalism,  in  that  the  former  is  a 
constitutional decision whilst the latter is the result of the political bargaining 
that  takes  place  both  before  and  after  the  constitution  of  a  country  is 
determined.   But it can produce comparable effects  insofar as it gives rise to 
inter‑jurisdictional  interactions,  even  though  it  is  only  in  federal  states  that 
state owned powers operate in a similar fashion to the property rights market 
,  and  hence  central  governments  cannot  legally  invade  decentralised 




Both  expenditure  decentralisation  and  tax  revenue  decentralisation  are 









Italy  with  Framework  laws,  or  in  Spain  with  Inter‑territorial  Councils  of 
regional  health  ministers)  restricts  the  autonomy  of  regional  states.    Fiscal 
autonomy  does  not  necessarily  contradict  the  existence  of  equalisation  and 
redistribution  (Oates,  1999),  as  most  decentralised  states  explicitly  or 
implicitly take these into account through unconditional grants.  
Together with fiscal responsibilities,  limits  to pre‑empt policy action  include 
central  government  regulation.  Indeed,  Piperno  (2000)  reports  that  in  Italy, 
national parliaments still invade decentralised responsibilities, and the central 
government  frequently  vetoes  regional  laws  which  lead  to  conflicts  of 
competence.    Most  often,  conflicts  are  solved  to  the  favour  of  central 
government,  which  directly  or  indirectly  (through  parliaments)  elects 
members of the Constitutional Court6.   
Today,  there  is  consensus  among  scholars  that  the  key  to  the  success  of 
decentralisation boils down  to  its  institutional design. More  specifically,  the 
extent  to which  decentralisation manages  to  align  political  credit  and  fiscal 
blame  for  each  policy within  the  health  system.    If  the  central  government 
does not decentralise the “blame” of public policy action (taxation) and only 
decentralises  mechanisms  of  credit  claiming  (expenditure),  it  is  likely  that 
decentralisation  will  bring  an  expansion  of  government  expenditure  with 
limited effects on efficiency (Costa‑Font, 2010). The latter is commonly known 
in  the  literature  as  soft  budget  constraints.  Similarly,  insufficient  subnational 
own  resources  (vertical  fiscal  imbalances)  as  a  cost  containment  strategy 
(Lopez‑Casanovas,  et  al,  2005)  can  hamper  the  degree  of  diversity  in  the 
system, and hence the extent of fiscal autonomy. In such cases, one might not 
observe generalised efficiency outcomes from government decentralisation.   
The  means  by  which  decentralisation  influences  health  systems  efficiency 
include  spotting  sources  of  red‑tape  and  mismanagement,  and,  when 
Joan Costa‐i‐Font 
7      
incentivised,  producing  cost–saving  experimentation  (Costa‑Font  and 




would  imply  that  some  forms of  competition between  levels of government 
exist,  and  as  we  argue  in  this  chapter,  depend  largely  on  how  the  health 
system  is  designed.  Hence,  not  all  decentralisation  processes  will  result  in 
better  health  system outcomes per  se.  The  limits  to  the design  of  fiscal  and 
politically  accountable  systems  of  governance  are  the  main  incentive 




Institutional  factors  such  as  political,social,  legal  and  historical  constraints 
play  a  role  in  restricting  the  efficiency  of  fiscal  decentralisation.  A  central 
question that remains unanswered in the literature is whether federalism is an 








have  not  decentralised  the  provision  of  health  care  to  subcentral 
governments.    Importantly,  evidence  on  unadjusted  relative  health 
Fiscal Federalism and European Health System Decentralization 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expenditure  suggests  that  decentralised  health  systems  do  not  exhibit 
significantly  different  levels  of  relative  expenditure,  but  countries  that  are 
organised as  federal states have  traditionally exhibit about 1% more of  their 
GDP  towards  expenditures  than  the  rest,  though  patterns  seem  to  reveal  a 





service  delivery  or  accessibility  goals.  Whilst  one  function  includes  global 
public  goods  (e.g.,  management  of  epidemics,  drug  patenting,  etc.),  other 
components of the health system are primarily local public goods and can be 
efficiently managed  at  the  local  or  regional  level.  Even  in  the US,  there has 
been an expansion of federal health care programs and expenditure together 








financed  and  whether  they  have  health  care  responsibilities  or  not  which 
makes all the difference.  
The  existence  of  externalities  implies  that  the  productivity  effects  of  health 
programs might spill over to other  jurisdictions, especially  if  individuals are 






Decentralisation  is  naturally  an  institutional  embrace  of  heterogeneity.  Yet, 
whether  decentralisation  is  desirable  or  not  depends  on  whether  the  gains 
from  addressing  regional  heterogeneity  are  greater  than  lower  scale 
economies  and  higher  transaction  costs  that  a  centralised  health  system 
would entail. Many health care services, with  the exception of public health 
attention  of  vaccines  and  epidemics,  qualify  as  regional  public  goods  as 
information  specific  needs  and  preferences  tends  to  be  scattered  over  large 




of  regional public goods come with a cost  to  taxpayers  that would not exist 





differ  over  the  territory,  then  some  level  of  sorting  could  take  place  if 
individuals  are  able  to  vote  with  their  feet  and  either  choose  health  care 
outsidetheir state or reside in the area where their preferences for health care 
match  the existing  supply.   Examples demonstrate why  there  is  evidence of 





not  be  high  enough  to  compensate  for  costs  of  mobility  within  a  given 
territory,  unless  heavily  specialised.    Another  criticism  that  would  more 
generally  challenge  the  benefit  of  decentralisation  against  a  uniform  central 




a  one  off  event  or  endure  over  time,  and  eventually  lead  to  cost  savings  as 
some studies identify (Costa‑Font and Moscone, 2008). Similarly, the question 
of veto points ‑ although it is treated more specifically in the next chapter on 
political  decentralization  ‑  is  double‑edged  in  that  some  studies  reveal  that 
decentralisation  can  actually  help  to  dissolve  the  blame  and  give  rise  to 
reform  (Costa‑Font,  2010).  Decentralisation  thus  might  provide  an 
opportunity to overcome a central level veto or policy neglect.  This is the case 
for  mental  health  care  in  Spain,  where  decentralisation  has  allowed 






Possibly  one  of  the most  important  benefits  of  government  decentralisation 
lies in the associated effect of competition between constituent governments, 






action  with  taxes  (and  form  Wicksellian  connections).  However, 
decentralisation  implies  the  introduction  of  another  level  of  government  in 
the  provision  of  health  care,  which,  unless  responsibilities  are  fully 
transferred  to  region  states,  can  blur  the  lines  of  accountability,  especially 
when region states lack a parliament where incumbents are held accountable 
for their policies.  
One of  the main reasons  to keep some health services centralised  lies  in  the 
existence  of  optimal  scale  for  global  public  goods.  This  is  the  case  for  the 
management of epidemics. In addition to scale benefits of centralisation, it is 
important  to  mention  externalities  or  inter‑jurisdictional  spillovers,  both 
positive and negative,  that  can  in  turn  lead  to an under or overprovision of 
public goods. However, some theoretical research contends that  if spillovers 
are  high  enough,  decentralised  expenditures  are  welfare  enhancing 
(Koethenbuerger, 2008).  
Another potential source of scepticism lies in the difficulty of citizens forming 
quality  perceptions  which  can  limit  the  benefits  from  competition,  and 
instead stakeholders might  take advantage of  their  informational position to 




might  have  fewer  incentives  to  compete,  which  can  mitigate  the  effect  of 
decentralization on the health system. The capacity to cooperate is influenced 
by the size of the regional health systems; generally if states are similar in size 






There  are  some  costs  todecentralising  a  health  system  as  well.  One  might 
argue  that  there are a variety of  sunk costs  in designing a  federal  structure. 
For instance, one would expect a certain level of duplicity in the early stages 
of  decentralisation.  This  is  true  in  the  case  of  Spain,  where  the  Spanish 
Ministry of Health remains intact and does not merge with other social policy 





in  a  territory  that  requires  some  specific  inter‑territorial  coordination  to  be 
facilitated by the central state.  
Another  argument  lies  in  the  need  for  health  system  coordination,  when 
cooperation  is expected  to be hard achieve.  Issues on  fiscal equalisation and 
guaranteeing some level of regional cohesion or equity in the provision health 





Indeed, whilst  competitive  federalist  systems  like  the US might  give  rise  to 
some  form  of  territorial  competition,  countries  following  cooperative 
federalist structures might engender inertia.  Inertia is typically resolved with 
some  level  of  negotiation  between  different  government  tiers,  and  when 




eliminate  bailout  expectations  (Turati  and  Bourginnon,  2009,  Crivelli  eta  al, 
2010). The expectation of subnational governments to receive additional funds 
in  the  event  of  financial need weakens  the budget  constraint  of  subnational 
governments that instead behave strategically.  The guarantee of no rescues is 
paramount,  otherwise  incentives  of  subcentral  governments  would  not  be 
aligned with that of the whole state and moral hazard effects would emerge. 














to  expand  expenditure  will  exist  and  efficiency  will  be  overlooked.  Fiscal 
federalism  theory  predicts  that  allocative  efficiency  improvements  follow 
from self‑financing states, and thus own‑taxes should be the primary revenue 
source. Social insurance systems reveal that states can veto tax increases, but 
cannot  veto  social  security  expansions,  which  might  actually  lead  to 
expenditure expansion under federalism, as in the case of Germany. The latter 
may be one reason  underpinning expenditure patterns displayed before.  Soft 
budget  constraints  in  health  care  are  specifically  problematic,  as  the  central 
government cannot credibly allow subnational governments to bankrupt itself 
in proving highly visible services such as health care. 
Second,  subnational  governments  must  have  adequate  resources  to  pursue 
their  activities,  and  include  a  certain  level  of  own  resources.  If  revenues  of 
subcentral governments do not equal or exceed their expenditures, then fiscal 
vertical  imbalances  arise.  Fiscal  imbalances  are  common  in  all  countries  as 
both  in unitary  states and  in  federations,  fiscal  revenues  (as a proportion of 
GDP) do not equal fiscal expenditures. This imbalance is corrected though the 
use  of  transfers,  which  can  be  discretionary  –  and  hence  politically 






Third,  together  with  vertical  imbalances,  one  can  identify  the  effects  of 
externalities or spillovers between regional governments, or that respond to a 
phenomenon  that  exceeds  the  jurisdictional  domain  of  the  regional 








share  of  own  taxe  revenue with  respect  to  transfers  differs  from  country  to 
country,  as well  as  the  specific  transfer  design.  Intergovernmental  transfers 
are viewed as a supplementary means of  finance  to address  the existence of 
externalities,  and  to  deal with  vertical  and  horizontal  imbalances.  Transfers 
act as a form of redistribution as well as a source of insurance against region 
specific shocks (e.g., epidemics). Transfers promote innovation when there are 
limits  in  the  capacity  of  region  states  to  invest  in  innovation,  and  are  also 
more  generally  employed  to  use  the  central  state  economies  of  scale  in  tax 
collection.  As  we  referred  to  before,  the  obvious  downside  is  that  unless 
transfers adjust for fiscal effort cto incentivise efficiency,  they can lead to soft 
budget constraints and more generally moral hazard problems.  
One  of  the  most  well  documented  empirical  regularities  in  the  fiscal 
federalism  literature  is  the so‑called  flypaper effect  (Hines and Thaler, 1995; 
Gamkhar  and  Shah,  2007).  This  effect  refers  to  the  observed  greater 
stimulatory effect of unconditional grants on local government spending than 
on  increases  in  community  income,  whihcn  is  a  form  of  .  moral  hazard.  
Hence, the design of a decentralised health system must take into account the 
undesirable  consequences  of  a  lack  of  clarity  in  who  bears  the  fiscal  and 
political blame. That  is,  if  there are fiscal vertical and horizontal  imbalances, 
the incentives of region states are to not keep fiscal discipline because doing 








of  a  bail  out  either  directly,  but  especially  indirectly,  though  fiscal 
equalisation  mechanisms.  Fiscal  equalisation  schemes  exist  in  almost  all 




Together  with  vertical  imbalances,  the  design  of  federal  health  systems 
considers  the  emergence  of  horizontal  imbalances,  which  are  differences  in 
health  outputs  between  jurisdictions  at  the  same  level  of  government.  Such 
imbalances can emerge primarily as a result of differences in regional capacity 
to  fund  public  services,  needs,  as  well  as  due  to  other  reasons,  such  as 
regional  choices  and  preferences.  Generally,  federal  inspired  systems  do 
consider  the  design  of  equalisation  grants  and  different  funds  to  subsidise 
equality. Furthermore, to deal with differences in needs, most federal systems 
take  some  risk  adjustment  criteria  when  designing  block  transfers,  or 
alternatively  equalisation  subsidies  are  used.  Finally,  horizontal  imbalances 
might result  too from differences  in preferences and values, which although 
challenges  a  certain  notion  of  uniformity‑equity,  also  allows  for  choice  and 
low cost experimentation. 
Several  studies  suggest  that  health  expenditure  per  capita  (a  measure  of 
unadjusted  output)  appears  to  decline  (or  not  to  increase)  with 
decentralisation. Baicker et al (2010), in their examination of fiscal federalism 




lower  regional  inequalities  in  2002,  ascompared  to  1957  before  devolution 
took place.  Similarly, in Spain, some studies find that regional inequalities in 
health,  education  and  social  care  have  declined.    Figure  2  below  compares 
regional  inequalities  in  Spain,  UK  and  England.  Importantly,  regional 
inequalities  in  Spain,  where  devolution  is  managed  regionally,  have 
decreased  by  50%, whilst  in  the  UK we  see  a more modest  decline,  but  in 
England,  a  highly  centralised  health  services  exhibits  high  regional 
inequalities,  with  rates  of  more  than  double  that  of  Spain,  which  in  turn 
appear stable over time.  
What can explain such a phenomenon? One explanation lies in the effects of 
equalisation  mechanisms  and  a  certain  failure  in  England  to  deal  with 
regional  specific needs and preferences. Whilst  this  is  true,  it does not  fully 
explain why we do not observe the same downward trend in Spain or in other 
countries  in  the  UK.    A  second  explanation  links  policy  diffusion  as  a 
mechanism  to  externalise  the  innovations,  whereby  traditionally  lagging 
regions  import  the  innovations  of  front‑runner  regions,  a  phenomenon 
previously  documented  in  Spain  (Costa‑Font  and  Rico,  2006a).  These 

























heterogeneous  preferences,  it  implies  a  loss  of  some  scale  economies  that 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Different  explanations  have  been  put  forward  to  explain  why  public 
expenditure increases after decentralisation: 
a) Short  term  scale  loss  vs.  long‑term  efficiency  gains.  Health  expenditure 
might  increase  but  the  total welfare  expenditure  in  the  long  run would not 
increase due  to  the  longer  term savings  that  come  from allocative efficiency 
gains  from  decentralisation  in  administrations  withmore  experience  in 
managing  budgets  in  comparison  to  centrally managed models.  This  is  the 
evidence  Costa‑Font  and  Moscone  (2008)  find  in  the  Spanish  system  of 
regional  health  care  services.  Their  findings  suggest  that  experience  in 
managing  health  care  responsibilities  is  associated  with  lower  per  capita 
expenditure. 
b) Collusion  (Brenan  and Buchanan,  1980)  due  to  horizontal  cooperation 
or  vertical  coordination  that  typically  takes  place  when  there  are  fiscal 
imbalances  resulting  from  expenditures  being  decentralised,  but  a  higher 
level of government collects taxes and assigns them through block transfers to 
the states. This is the case in the UK with the Barlett formula and in Spain for 
ordinary  regions  subject  to  common  financing  .  Alternatively,  one  can 
imagine the influence of the central state through laws that set out framework 
packages. Examples  from Italy show that  regulation has managed  to  reduce 






explain  below,  refers  to  competition  for underfunded policy  responsibilities 
when there are opportunities for credit claiming. Costa‑Font and Rico (2006a) 
reveal  that  the  rationale  of  vertical  competition  in  health  care  is  to  expand 
rather  that  reduce  health  care  expenditure.  An  important  consequence  of 
vertical competition is the development of policy innovation at the subcentral 
level  in  order  to  differentiate  themselves  from  other  region  states,  and  to 
avoid  competition.  Evidence  of  this  effect  on  pharmaceuticals  regulation 
explains  significant  policy  innovation  that  when  successful  tends  to  be 
diffused  (Costa‑Font  and Puig  Junoy,  2007). Oates  and Wallis  (1988) use  an 
alternative  explanation  for  expenditure  increases  based  on  the  existence  of 




and  hence  enhances  political  incentives  for  incumbents  to  influence  policy 
action  to  guarantee  re‑election.  If  the  incentives  of  regional  incumbents  are 
not  driven  by  mobility  but  exclusively  through  the  political  system,  then 
governments  will  attempt  to  accommodate  the  preferences  of  the  median 
voter.  If  the median  voter  favours widening  health  care  coverage,  as  is  the 
case  in  many  European  countries,  one  would  expect  inter‑jurisdictional 
competition to lead to an expansion of the size of the health system, and more 
generally to health care reform. 
e) Finally,  an  alternative  explanation  for  the  absence  of  a  race  to  the 
bottom  in health  care  lies  in  the  fact  that decentralisation  fiscal designs  rely 






A  potential  source  of  (horizontal)  government  competition  is  mobility‑
creating  welfare  or  quality‑driven  migration.  Patient  mobility  is  less  of  an 
issue  in  Europe  compared  to  the  US.  In  the  United  States,  40%  of  the 
population  live  in  a  different  state  than  that  of  birth,  and  the  percentage 
increases  to  50%  if  we  look  at  college  graduates  (Baicker  et  al  (2010).  
Similarly, 2.5% of US residents change state every year.  Mobility is far more 
limited in Europe for a variety of reasons, including the fact that individuals 
build  significant  regional  attachments  and  networks,  as well  as  other  social 
barriers like language that pertains even within countries such as Switzerland 
and  Spain.    In  addition  to  the  latter  constraints,  given  that  decentralisation 
empowers regional incumbents to improve the quality of their regional health 
systems, patient mobility becomes a residual in sorting out short term health 




For  decentralisation  mechanisms  to  work,  the  mechanisms  of  the  political 
agency need to be in place. That is, decision makers should be responsive to 
the demands of their constituents. The most obvious way for this to take place 
is  through  regional  or  statewide  electoral  processes  so  that  officials  in 
subnational  governments  align  their  own  preferences  for  improving  lives 













































































































The  link  between  decentralisation  and  experimentation  is  been  an  old 
argument that dates back to Hayek’s (1939) argument that decentralisation, by 
increasing  experimentation,  produces  more  information  on  how  to  run  a 
government. Health  care  is  one  of  the most  clear‑cut  examples  of  a  natural 
public  policy  experiment..  The    US  shows  how  federal  health  care  reform 
shares  significant  knowledge  from  health  care  reform  in  Massachusetts. 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Evidence  from  different  countries  reveals  that  experimentation  takes  place 
after  devolution  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  First,  junior  governments  tend  to 
legitimise  themselves  by  introducing  innovation  in  the  way  they  run  the 
health  system  (e,g.,  free  long  term  care  and  no  prescription  charges  in 
Scotland and Wales respectively). Second, decentralisation can provide voice 
to the opposition party or regional minorities which would be lacking under a 
decentralised system. This gives  rise  toa degree of vertical  competition with 
the  central  government  that  can  provide  additional  political  incentives  for 
innovation (Costa‑Font and Rico, 2006a). Finally, if soft budget constraints are 
corrected,  decentralisation  can  provide  fiscal  incentives  for  innovation, 




The  fiscal  federalism  literature  (Breton  1996)  contends  that  governments 
compete.  However,  in  understanding  the  wide  range  of  competitive 
relationships  one  must  distinguish  vertical  from  horizontal  forms  of 
competition,  such  that  interactions  between  differing  levels  of  governments 
are  differentiated.  The  most  obvious  means  of  competition  comes  out  of 
tournaments  theory,  whereby  citizens  of  one  jurisdiction  evaluate  the 
performance  of  their  own  constituency  against  other  jurisdictions  (Salmon, 
1987).  The main  downside  of  such  a mechanism  is  that  performance  is  not 
easily observable,  especially  the quality dimensions which motivate  citizens 
to  either  move  or  use  political  agency  to  punish  or  reward  the  incumbent 
party  ruling  the health  system.   Not even  the World Health Organisation  is 
able  to  fully  evaluate  the  performance  of  different  health  systems. 
Nonetheless,  even  if  citizens  can  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  health 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when  regional  voting  occurs,  regional  elections  must  be  sufficiently 




One  of  the  common  concerns  about  the  decentralisation  of  health  policy  is 
that  of  capture,  leading  to  policy  failure.  Decentralisation  can  bring  local 
producers  and  regulators  closer  together,  which  might  reduce  information 
asymmetries  ‑  but  if  mechanisms  of  public  sector  purchasing  are  not 
transparent enough, this may lead to the risk of local capture (Laffont, 2000). 
On  the other hand,  it  is well documented  that decentralisation  increases  the 
transaction  costs  of  capture  at  the  country  level.    Hence,  whether 
decentralisation gives rise to or serves as an incentive to contain the effects of 
regulatory  capture  of  European  health  systems  depends  generally  on  the 
effects  it has on transparency and corruption  in general, and/or whether  the 









This  paper  has  attempted  to  bring  together  a  broad  set  of  questions  on  the 
decentralisation of health systems.    It argues  that decentralisation  is a proxy 
for  subnational  autonomy,  and  its  success  in  tackling  heterogeneity  in 
preferences  and needs depends  on  its  design.  Particularly  important design 
features include addressing fiscal  imbalances, promoting competition, policy 
innovation and making sure that the mechanisms of the political agency align 
individuals’ preferences  and needs with  that  of  their  incumbent’s priorities.  
However,  there  are  several  limits  to  the  success  of  decentralised  health 
systems,  including  the  alignment  of  fiscal  and  political  accountability,  the 
design of resource allocation mechanisms that bypass soft budget constraints, 
and more generally the development of incentives to policy diffusion that, if 




                                                        1  So  that  “each  public  service  is  provided  by  the  jurisdiction  having  control  over  the  minimum 
geographic area that would internalise benefits and costs of such provision.” 2  The  latter  is  in many ways  a  return  to  the  classical  claim  that  “a  representative  government 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